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Destruction of cultural property and cultural heritage dates back a long time and has been an 
inherent component in all armed conflicts. Cultural property has been the object of protection 
in several international treaties over the years. The 1954 Hague Convention and its Additional 
Protocol I and Second Protocol contains provisions entailing individual criminal 
responsibility for destruction of cultural property in armed conflict.1 The 1954 Hague 
Convention however, applies to a more selective range of cultural property than the 
customary international law applicable during armed conflict, as its limited to “cultural 
property of great importance to the cultural heritage of people”.2 
The special significance that is given to religious sites and cultural property makes the 
destruction of cultural property an effective repressing tool, often used against minorities to 
erase their culture.3 Although destruction of cultural property and heritage may be less 
shocking than genocide, mass rape and other crimes against humanity, it is still of 
considerable significance, because such acts can have long term effects on the identity of 
cultural groups. Not only does destruction of cultural property impact the people of the 
cultural group, but it serves to decrease cultural diversity in the world.4  
The Balkan Wars in the 1990s saw how cultural destruction was linked to attempts at ethnic 
cleansing. In more recent years the international community has witnessed large scale 
destruction of cultural property by extremist groups like ISIS, Al Qaeda and other affiliated 
groups. The result of this is that there has been increased calls to end impunity for this type of 
crime. 5  
                                                
1 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with 
Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, 14 May 1954. Protocol to the Convention 
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 14 May 1954. Second 
Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event 
of Armed Conflict, 26 March 1999. [Hereafter 1954 Hague Convention, Protocol I and 
Second Protocol] 
2 1954 Hague Convention, art. 1.  
3 Gottlieb, Yaron. (2005). ”Criminalizing Destruction of Cultural Property: A Proposal for Defining New Crimes 
under the Rome Statute of the ICC”. 
4 Thomas, Sarah J. “Prosecuting the Crime of Destruction of Cultural Property.” 
5 South China Morning Post 2017. UNESCO in war against Islamic State to protect world’s cultural heritage 




On 26 September of 2016, the ICC of convicted Al Mahdi for intentionally directing attacks 
against religious and historic buildings in Timbuktu.6 The Al Mahdi case represents an 
important development in the protection of cultural property in international criminal law. Al 
Mahdi is the first individual that has been held responsible for destruction of cultural property 
as the only or principal charge before the ICC.  
However, the case has raised some questions in the international community. One of the main 
criticism has been that the case was inadmissible, because it didn’t meet the gravity threshold 
in art. 17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute. 7 It has been questioned whether the drafters of the Rome 
Statute envisaged to prosecute cultural destruction when not in combination with other war 
crimes.8 
1.2 Thesis 
This thesis seeks to analyse wilful destruction of cultural property as the principal charge 
before the ICC and the gravity threshold.  
All crimes falling under the Rome Statute are of a serious nature. However, art. 17(1)(d) 
stipulates that cases “not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court” are 
inadmissible. Cases that are brought before the ICC must therefore be “of sufficient gravity” 
to be admissible. This raises questions as to how the gravity threshold should be interpreted 
and applied by the Court. The Rome Statute’s guidance as to how this threshold should be 
interpreted limited. There are no provisions expressly stating how the gravity threshold should 
be determined. 
The aim of this thesis to establish whether willful destruction of cultural property as a 
principal charge can meet the gravity threshold. The thesis will look at how the gravity 
threshold has been interpreted and applied by the ICC, and try to establish how it should 
applied.  Secondly, the thesis will consider the Al Mahdi case and whether it is in line with the 
gravity treshold. 
                                                
6 Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, TC, Judgement and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15-171. [Herafter Al 
Mahdi] 






Article 21 of the Rome Statute stipulates the Courts applicable law. The provision includes 
both sources of law specific to the ICC9 and general international sources of law.10 The 
sources are enumerated and ranked. 
In the first place the Court shall apply the Rome Statue, the Elements of Crimes and the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence.11 The wording establishes a hierarchy between these internal 
sources and other sources of law. In the event of conflict between the Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, the Statute shall prevail.12 
The question of how these instruments should be interpreted are not addressed in the Rome 
Statute. The Statute only states that the interpretations must be consistent with internationally 
recognized human rights13  and that the definitions of crimes should be strictly construed and 
not extended by analogy.14 Where appropriate, applicable treaties and principles and rules of 
international law can be applied.15 
The Rome Statute is a treaty. It will therefore be interpreted according to the rules set forth by 
art. 31 and 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.16 Art. 31 of the Vienna 
Convention stipulates that interpretation of treaties shall be based on literal, contextual and 
teleological considerations. The travaux prèparatoires of the Rome Statute can be used to 
confirm interpretations made based on literal, contextual and teleological considerations.17 
1.4 Limitations and Outline 
The admissibility analysis of the Al Mahdi case will be limited to the gravity threshold. The 
issues of self-referrals and complementarity will not be raised due to space. 
Chapter 2 will look at the history and developments in protection of cultural property. It will 
also establish underlying offences against cultural property in international criminal law. 
                                                
9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 21(1)(a) and 21(2). [The Rome Statute] 
10 Rome Statute, art. 21(b)-(c). 
11  Rome Statute,art. 21(1)(a). 
12 Rome Statute, art. 51(1). 
13 Rome Statute, art. 21(3). 
14 Rome Statute, art. 22(2). 
15 Rome Statute, art. 21(1)(b). 
16 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. [Vienna Convention] 




Chapter 3 will look at the gravity threshold under the Rome Statute and how the gravity 
threshold has been interpreted and applied by the Court and the OTP. 
Chapter 2 will present the Al Mahdi case and the Trial Chambers assessment of the gravity of 
the crime 
Chapter 4 will analyse if destruction of cultural property as the principle charge meets the 
gravity threshold. and if the crimes committed by Al Mahdi were sufficient grave to justify 
action by the ICC.  
1.5 International Criminal Law 
International criminal law is a branch of public international law designed to prohibit certain 
categories of conduct and to hold the persons engaging in such conduct criminally liable.18 
The core crimes under international criminal law are genocide, crimes against humanity, 
torture, aggression, war crimes and terrorism.19 International criminal law springs from 
international law, as well as national criminal law.20 The rules of international criminal law 
originates from sources of international law, such as treaties and customary international 
law.21 
International criminal law authorize states, or obliges them to prosecute and punish such 
criminal conduct, while it also regulates international proceedings before international 
criminal courts.22  
The body of international criminal law consist both of substantive law and procedural law. It 
is built on the notion that international criminal law is capable of imposing obligations 
directly on individuals, without the intermediary of the state wielding authority over such 
individuals.23 In other words, individuals have international duties which transcends the 
national obligations of obedience imposed by the state. The substantial law of international 
criminal law consist of the rules specifying; acts that are prohibited, the subjective elements 
                                                
18 Cassese, Antonio (2013). International Criminal Law, p.3 
19 Rome Statute art.5 
20 Cassese (2013) p.5 
21 Ibid, p.3. 




required for accountability, possible excuses or justifications for such acts, and on which 
conditions states may or must prosecute persons accused of one of these crimes.24 
International criminal law is a relatively new and rudimentary branch of law. While rules of 
warfare have a long tradition, it is only in more recent history, after World War II, that 
categories of new crimes have developed.  It is also only more recently that individuals have 
been held directly and personally accountable for crimes committed. Rules of warfare used to 
be addressed to states as belligerent parties only. 
The development of international criminal law has been a slow and complex process. When a 
new category of a crime has developed, the objective and subjective criteria for accountability 
have not been made completely clear. International criminal law is therefore not yet a 
coherent legal system.25 
1.6 The International Criminal Court 
The ICC is a permanent international court for prosecuting and trying individuals accused of 
committing the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.26 It consists of 
four organs: the Presidency, the Judicial Division, the Registry and the Office of the 
Prosecutor.  
The Court was established by the international community and has jurisdiction over war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and the crime of aggression.27 The main goal of 
the ICC is to contribute to ending impunity for perpetrators of such crimes and prevent these 
crimes from happening.28 The primary objectives for punishment at the ICC are retribution 
and deterrence. 29 The ICC is different from other international tribunals and courts, as it is 
not limited by geographic or time constraints.30 However, the jurisdiction of the Court is 
somewhat limited by complementarity and the so-called gravity threshold.31 The ICC is 
                                                
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid, p.5. 
26 Rome Statute, art. 1 . 
27 Art. 5 . 
28 Preamble . 
29 Al Mahdi, para 66. 
30 E.g ICTY has mandate to bring to justice those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991. http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/mandate-and-crimes-
under-icty-jurisdiction 




complementary to national courts32 and can only intervene when a State is either unable or 
unwilling to investigate and prosecute the alleged perpetrators.33 The case must also be of 
“sufficient gravity” to justify further action by the Court.34 
1.6.1 Background 
The creation of the ICC came as a result of events taking place in the 20th century. After 
World War I came a period with numerous attempts at establishing international criminal 
institutions of different kinds.35 The failure to establish international criminal institutions at 
that time was largely due to how high national sovereignty was placed. 36 The atrocities 
committed during World War II, however, led to the establishment of the Tokyo and 
Nuremberg Tribunals. This was an important development in international criminal law. Even 
if the Tribunals have been criticized for applying ex post facto law, their establishment 
showed the possibilities of international criminal justice.37 The successful Post-Cold War 
establishments of the ICTY and ICTR in the 1990s increased the support for the creation of an 
international criminal court.38 
 
The Rome Statute, the treaty that established the ICC, was entered into force 1th of July 
2002.39 The Rome Statute sets out the crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court, the 
rules of procedure and the mechanisms for states to cooperate with the ICC.40 According to 
art. 12, the ICC has jurisdiction over the crimes referred to in art. 5, where the alleged 
perpetrator is a national of a State Party or when the crime was committed on the territory of a 
State Party, known as territorial and active personality jurisdiction. Non-party States may 
accept the exercising of jurisdiction by the Court.41 This means that the ICC does not have 
universal jurisdiction over the crimes listed in art. 5, but works as an agent of the State.42 It’s 
                                                
32 Art.1 and art. 17(1)(a-c) 
33 Art. 17(1)(a)-(c). 
34 Art. 17(1)(d). 
35 Cassese (2013) p. 253. 
36 Ibid p. 255 
37 Byron, Christine (2009). War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, p. 1. 
38 Ibid p.3 
39 https://www.icc-cpi.int/about  
40 P, 2. https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/get-involved/lesson1.pdf  
41 Art. 12(3). 
42 Davids, Joseph (2009) “Jurisdiction and Admissibility Before the International Criminal Court”. p. 4. 
 
 
not the inherent nature of the crimes in art. 5 that gives the ICC authority, but the surrendering 
of jurisdictional competence on the part of either a territorial or national State. 43 
 
 
                                                




2 The Criminalisation of Wilful 
Destruction of Cultural Property 
2.1 History and Developments in the Protection of 
Cultural Property 
The Lieber Code from 1863, represents the first to attempt to codify the laws of war.44 It was 
also the first legal document referring to the protection of cultural property. The first 
international document was the 1874 Declaration of Brussels, although it was never ratified.45 
However, the concept of protecting certain forms of immovable property largely influenced 
the later adopted 1907 Hague Convention, which is now considered customary international 
law.  
During World War I, cultural property suffered grave damage after acts of destruction. The 
destruction of cultural property during World War I, however, paled in comparison with 
Germany’s systematic destruction and plundering during World War II. Hitler’s attempt to 
have Notre Dame destroyed, made it clear that a legal framework was needed to punish such 
acts.46 The Nuremberg Tribunal was therefore given jurisdiction over war crimes including 
“plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or 
devastation not justified by military necessity”.47 The resulting Nuremberg Trials are 
considered the first true international enforcement of protection of cultural property.48  
The recognition by the international community of the need for a separate instrument 
concerned only with protecting cultural property during armed conflicts led to the adoption of 
the 1954 Hague Convention.49 The 1954 Hague Convention covers movable and immovable 
objects, and obligates the parties of the treaty to establish measures to safeguard cultural 
                                                
44 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 24 April 1863. [Lieber Code] 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/110 
45 Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War. Brussels, 27 August 1874 [Brussels 
Declaration] 
46 Guy-Ryan 2016. “The Destruction of Precious Cultural Property”. 
47 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Art. 6(b). [Nuremberg Charter] 
48 Gottlieb (2005), p. 860 




property.50 Art. 28 of the 1954 Hague Convention require State Parties to “undertake[…]all 
necessary steps to prosecute and impose penal […]sanctions” upon those individuals who 
commits breaches of the Convention.51 In other words, destruction of cultural property can 
produce individual criminal responsibility.  
The effectiveness of the Convention was reduced by failure to enumerate specific offenses 
that could bring about criminal prosecutions. In addition, the implementation and enforcement 
of art. 28 was left solely up to member states, giving them an excessive margin of 
discretion.52 The 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions reiterated the 
obligations protect cultural property.53 However, the protection of cultural property proved to 
be ineffective in the conflicts which followed.54 
Despite the creation of new legal framework, plundering and destruction of cultural heritage 
continued. The Khmer Rouge destroyed nearly 2,000 temples and monasteries during the 
Cambodian Civil War, as they tried to eradicate Buddhism from the country.55 In the 1990s, 
the Balkan Wars witnessed the attacks on many historical sites and cities. The Old Town of 
Dubrovnik was shelled and Stari Most in Mostar was completely destroyed. As a result the 
ICTY was granted jurisdiction over the war crime of “seizure of, destruction or willful 
damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, 
historic monuments and works of art and science”.56 With the memory of the Balkan Wars in 
mind, the drafters of the ICC created art. 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute, 
which gives the Court jurisdiction over the war crime consisting of intentionally directing 
attacks against “buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, 
[and] historic monuments”. 
The deficiencies in the 1954 Hague Convention resulted in the adoption of the Second 
Protocol in 1999. Unfortunately, even after the adoption of the Second Protocol, the 
international community has witnessed the continued disregard for cultural property and 
                                                
50 1954 Hague Convention, art. 28. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Gottlieb (2005) p. 861. 
53 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. 
54 Ibid, p. 862 
55 Wallace, Charles P 1990. “Buddhism Rising Again From The Ashes of Cambodia”. 




heritage, like the Taliban’s dismantling of the Buddha statues in Bamiyan57 and ISIS’s 
destruction of artifacts in the Mosul Museum in Iraq and in Palmyra.58 
Destruction of cultural property during armed conflict has traditionally received more 
attention in the international arena. This has led to advancements in individual criminal 
responsibility for persons involved in destruction of cultural property in armed conflicts. The 
legal framework for destruction of cultural property committed in peacetime remains notably 
weaker. The justifications for this distinction, however, can be said to be questionable on both 
the pragmatic and normative level.59 
2.2 Underlying Offences 
2.2.1 The General Requirement of the Existence of an Armed Conflict 
The existence of an armed conflict is a necessary legal condition for the commission of a war 
crime. In addition, the destruction of cultural property must have “nexus” to the armed 
conflict, in order to qualify as a war crime.60 Laws of War apply in the whole territory of 
states at war, or in non-international armed conflicts, the territory under the control of a party 
to the conflict. The Laws of War continue to apply until peace is established or a peaceful 
settlement is achieved.61 The armed conflict must have played a substantial role in the 
perpetrator’s ability or decision to commit the crime, and the in the manner or purpose for 
which it was committed.62 
2.2.2 Core Offence: Unlawful attacks against cultural property 
Customary international law encompasses individual criminal responsibility for unlawfully 
directing attacks against cultural property, both in international and non-international armed 
conflicts, as long as such property is not a military objective. This responsibility is 
distinguishable from unlawful attacks against civilian objects.63 The Rome Statute, for 
                                                
57 Kakissis, Joanna 2011. “Bit By Bit, Afghanistan Rebuild Buddhist Statues”. 
58 Destruction of cultural property committed by the ISIS is extensive. For a more complete overview see: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Destruction_of_cultural_heritage_by_ISIL 
 
59 Gottlieb (2005), p. 858 
60 See Rome Statute Art. 8(2)(b)(ix): “in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict”. 
61 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic,TC, Judgement, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para 55. 
62 Ibid, para 58. 
63 O’Keefe, Roger (2010). “Protection of Cultural Property Under International Criminal Law” 
 
 
example, only recognizes the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against civilian 
objects, when the attack takes place in an international armed conflict.64  
The meaning of “military objective” in customary international law, is the same as the 
definition in art. 52(2) of  the Additional Protocol I. In other words, objects “which by their 
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action”, and in 
addition “whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances 
ruling at the time” offers a definitive military advantage.65 In the majority of cases, however, 
cultural property will not constitute a military objective. Intentional attacks on cultural 
property will therefore often, constitute a war crime in both non-international and 
international armed conflicts.66 
Types of cultural property that may constitute a military objective can be; historic forts, 
bridges or cultural property located in the battlefield. The principal basis for which an attack 
against cultural property may not be a war crime, is if its use makes an effective contribution 
to military action.67 Nevertheless, such an attack will only be lawful if its “destruction, 
capture or neutralization […] offers a definitive military advantage”.68 This is known in 
international criminal law as “military necessity”. The war crime of intentional destruction of 
cultural property under the Rome Statute accepts military necessity as an exception.69 The 
absence of military necessity is an element of the crime when it comes to destruction of 
cultural property.70 When military necessity is an element of the crime, it rests with the 
prosecution to prove the absence of it. If the prosecution fails to accomplish this, they have 
not proven that a crime has been committed.  Military necessity is therefore not a “defence” in 
it proper form, but a challenge to if a crime has been committed.71 Military necessity as a 
“defence”, either as an excuse or a justification, is limited to those war crimes which the 
absence of military necessity is not an element.72 
2.2.2.1 Is it necessary that the cultural objects are destructed or damaged? 
                                                
64 Rome Statute, art. 8(2)(b)(ii). 
65 Additional Protocol I, art. 52. 
66 O’Keefe (2010). 
67 Ibid.  
68 Additional Protocol I, Art. 52. 
69 Rome Statute, srt.8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv). 
70 Hayashi (2010) p.130 
71 Ibid, p. 132 




A question that can be raised, is whether it is necessary that the cultural objects are destructed 
or damaged, because of the attack, for it to constitute the war crime of attacking cultural 
property.73  
This question is solved differently in the ICTY Statute and the Rome Statute of the ICC.  In 
art. 3(d) of the ICTY Statue, the wording of the provision is that “seizure of, destruction or 
[…] damage” of cultural property is prohibited. The Rome Statute on the other hand, refers to 
“directing an attack [against]” such property. The solution used in the Rome Statute appears 
to be consistent with art. 53 in the Additional Protocol I74, and seems to be the better position, 
as the underlying customary international humanitarian law prohibits directing attacks against 
cultural property.75  
2.2.2.2. Mens Rea 
The required mens rea of the crime is intent and knowledge.76 The meaning of “knowledge” 
is “awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of 
events”.77 In other words, the perpetrator must have intentionally or wilfully directed the 
attack against cultural property, in the knowledge that the object was cultural property. 
It is unclear whether, recklessness would suffice under customary international law.78 The 
ICTY has stated that the intent requirement means; “knowledge and willful” or “in reckless 
disregard of the substantial likelihood of the destruction or damage”.79 While the Rome 
Statute’s definition is that a perpetrator has intent relating to conduct, when he “means to 
engage in the conduct”. 
2.2.3 Unlawful Acts of Hostility Against Cultural Property other than 
Attacks 
O’Keefe mentions demolition by the planting of explosives or by bulldozers, jackhammers or 
other wrecking equipment, as unlawful acts of hostilities against cultural property other than 
attacks.80 He argues that such acts of hostility, are treated under the customary war crime of 
                                                
73 O’Keefe (2010) 
74 ICRC Commentary, Art. 53, n. 2070 
75 O’Keefe (2010) 
76 Rome Statute Art.30 
77 Ibid, Art. 30(3) 
78 O’Keefe (2010) 
79 Prosecutor v. Br∂anin. TC, Judgement, IT-99-36-A, para. 599. 
80 O’Keefe (2010) 
 
 
destroying the enemy’s property in art. 8(2)(b)(xiii) and 8(2)(e)(xii) of the Rome Statute, 
because cultural property is protected from acts of hostility other than attacks by customary 
international law in both international and non-international armed conflict.81 
2.2.4 Unlawful Appropriation of Cultural Property 
Both the Nuremberg Charter and the ICTY Statute contains provisions granting jurisdiction 
over the war crime of plunder of private property.82 Furthermore, art. 3(d) of the ICTY Statute 
grants the ICTY jurisdiction over the war crime “seizure of […] works of art and science”.  
The Rome Statutes makes the “seizing the enemy’s property unless such […] seizure be 
imperatively demanded”, and the pillaging of a town or place war crimes.83 
Customary international law protects cultural property from seizure both in international and 
non-international armed conflicts, provided such seizure is not demanded by the necessities of 
war.84 
2.3 Destruction of Cultural Property in the Rome Statute 
Art. 8 in the Rome Statute defines a number of war crimes that can be used in cases related to 
cultural heritage destruction. Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) makes “[e]xtensive destruction and appropriation 
of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly” a war 
crime. Moreover, art. 8(2)(b)(ii) makes it a war crime to intentionally direct “attacks against 
civilian objects”. “Civilian objects” are objects that are not military objectives. «Intentionally 
directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable 
purposes, provided they are not military objectives» is also war crime.85 Furthermore, 
“[d)estroying or seizing the enemy’s property unless such destruction or seizure be 
imperatively demanded”, and “[p]illaging a town or place” can be war crimes.86 
2.3.1 Art. 8(2)(e)(iv) 
                                                
81 Ibid. 
82 Nuremberg Charter art. 6(b) and the ICTY Statute art. 3(e) 
83 Rome Statute, art. 8(2)(b)(xiii) and 8(2)(b)(xvi) 
84 O’Keefe (2010) 
85 Art. 8(2)(b)(ix) and Art. 8(2)(e)(iv) 




The Rome Statute’s art. 8(2)(e)(iv) and art. 8(2)(b)(ix) criminalizes destruction of cultural 
property. The elements in art. 8(2)(e)(iv) and art. 8(2)(b)(ix) are essentially identical. Article 
8(2)(e)(iv) is the non-international armed conflict analogue of art.8(2)(b)(ix).87 The only 
difference is the contextual requirement of an international armed conflict in Art. 8(2)(b)(ix). 
Art. 8(2)(e)(iv) constitutes lex specials to other provisions proscribing destruction of civilian 
property. 
According to the Elements of Crime, there are five condition that must be met, for an 
individual to be held accountable with destruction of cultural property in an armed conflict.88 
Firstly, the alleged perpetrator must have “directed an attack”. Secondly, the object of the 
attack must be “one or more buildings dedicated to religion, education art, science or 
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are 
collected”, provided they are not military objectives. Thirdly, the perpetrator must have the 
requisite intention, namely that he “intended such building or buildings…to be the object of 
the attack”. The conduct must have taken place “in the context of and was associated with an 
(international) armed conflict”. Lastly, the perpetrator must have been “aware of factual 
circumstances that established the existence of an (international) armed conflict”.  
2.3.2 Limitations of the Rome Statute 
«Cultural property» is not defined in the Statute. In addition, the articles that protects specific 
types of cultural property, provides the same level of protection to hospitals and places where 
sick and wounded are collected.89 
Other than historic monuments, all protected property under art. 8(2)(e)(iv) is defined by its 
nature or purpose.90 This suggests that the property may lose its protective nature when its 
purpose is no longer fulfilled.91 A seemingly better method would be to define and 
differentiate cultural property from other types of property92, as it is done in some 
international conventions.93 
                                                
87 Al Mahdi, para 17. 
88 Art. 8(2)(e)(iv) 
89 Art. 8(2)(b)(ix) and Art. 8(2)(e)(iv) 
90 Also art. 8(2)(b)(ix) 
91 Gottlieb (2005), p. 866 
92 Ibid. 
93 See 1954 Hague Convention art. 1 
 
 
An additional disadvantage is that the Rome Statute allows attacks if they are of «military 
necessity» or if the property has become a «military objective»,94 just as the 1954 Hague 
Convention. Furthermore, it fails to criminalize the use of cultural property in support of a 
military action.  This can possibly be a major threat the protection of cultural property. If a 
party to a conflict makes cultural property a military objective, an attack by the belligerent 
party would not be unlawful if it constituted a “military necessity” to destroy it. If a party to a 
conflict, intentionally uses cultural property so that it becomes a “military objective”, it 
appears somewhat unreasonable that they can’t be prosecuted. Wanting to destroy cultural 
property of a particular group, can make it desirable to turn such buildings or monuments into 
military objectives. The Rome Statute should therefore criminalize the use of cultural 
property in support of a military action. The 1977 Protocols has recognized wrongful use of 
cultural property in military action. All use of historic monuments and places of worship 
which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples are prohibited. 95 
Gottlieb argues that «the more conservative approach to the crime of destruction of cultural 
property appears surprising in light of the significant developments in the field since World 
War II and in view of the sights of destruction witnessed by the world in recent armed 
conflicts such as in the former Yugoslavia.96  
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3 Admissibility before the ICC 
3.1 Introduction  
Article 17 establishes the conditions for a case to be admissible before the ICC. For a case to 
be admissible, four conditions must be met. The first three requirements of this test are known 
as complementarity requirements. The complementarity principle requires the Court to 
consider whether the case is being or has been “investigated or prosecuted by a State”. 
Secondly, the case is inadmissible if the competent State has decided not to prosecute or if the 
person concerned has already been tried. The second part of the admissibility test requires the 
Court to determine whether the case is of “sufficient gravity to justify further action”, the so-
called “gravity threshold”.  
The Statute does not set out which order these two conditions are to be dealt with. In practice 
the OTP has applied gravity first, and has not addressed complementarity if gravity provided 
a basis for rejecting a situation. The Chambers, on the other hand, have applied 
complementarity first.97 The Rome Statute itself seems to point in the same direction, as 
complementarity is mentioned before gravity.98 
3.2 The Gravity Threshold under the Rome Statute 
Although any crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court is serious, art. 17(1)(d) of the 
Rome Statute establishes that for a case to be admissible before the ICC, it must be “of 
sufficient gravity to justify further action by the court”. 99  
The gravity threshold plays two distinct and important roles. Firstly, the determination of the 
gravity threshold is of significance when the Court is deciding if a case can be tried. 
Secondly, the OTP assesses gravity when deciding whether to open an investigation into a 
situation, and when it selects individual cases from inside that situation.100 The gravity 
analysis done by the OTP is also significant, as the OTP’s gravity analysis will decide if a 
case is brought before the ICC. 
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Deciding what may constitute sufficient gravity that justifies action by the Court, is a complex 
matter where one need to look beyond the language of art. 17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute.101 
3.2.1 Origin and Purpose 
The concept of gravity is a central principle in international criminal law. There are references 
to gravity throughout the Rome Statute. Despite this the Rome Statute provides little 
explanation into what this concept encompasses. The references to gravity in the Rome 
Statute reflects the philosophical vision102 of the court, but fails to provide any clear legal 
guidance as to how gravity should be assessed. The gravity threshold is not defined in the 
Rome Statute or Regulations of the Court, but when taking its preamble and Article 5 into 
consideration it is clear that the ICC should only hear the most serious cases of international 
concern. The preamble of the Statute declares that the intention of the ICC is to end impunity 
for “the most serious crimes of international concern”.103 The Court should therefore hear 
only the most serious cases of international concern.104  
The gravity threshold as requirement for admissibility is in line with the overall goal the ICC, 
namely deterrence through the threat of prosecution and punishment of grave crimes that 
threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world.105 The original philosophy behind 
introducing the gravity threshold was to prevent the Court from becoming flooded with cases 
and therefore ineffective. 106 The crimes to be tried by the Court had to be limited to those of 
an extremely serious nature which had grave consequences for the international community, 
and the criminals to be tried by it should be only the principal perpetrators. 107 The concept of 
gravity originally emerged in debates concerning the appropriate subject matter jurisdiction of 
the Court. Initially, the subject matter jurisdiction was much wider than what was finally 
granted in the Rome Statute.108 The broad subject matter jurisdiction caused concerns that the 
Court would be over-burdened. The gravity provision was therefore added so the Court could 
manage the case load according to available resources. The lack of significant discussion 
about the gravity threshold, however, seems to dispute that the drafter intended it to be 
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interpreted as a big limitation on the Courts jurisdiction.109 Some have argued that the rational 
deduction would be that the drafters intention was to exclude the kind of trivial conduct that 
the ICTY excludes based on the “seriousness” requirement in its statute, like a combatant 
stealing a loaf of bread in an occupied village.110 
The contextual characteristics of crimes against humanity and genocide, aims to differentiate 
these crimes from other less serious crimes, through elements indicating gravity.111 
Contrastingly, war crimes do not incorporate contextual characteristics ensuring their gravity. 
The gravity threshold therefore ensures that cases that don’t present some indication of 
gravity, won’t be admissible.112 
3.2.2 Interpretation and Application of the Gravity Threshold 
3.2.2.1 Office of the Prosecutor 
 The OTP was the first organ of the ICC to interpret and apply the concept of gravity under 
the Rome Statute, and the OTP continues to refer to gravity when explaining the office’s 
policies of selecting certain investigations and cases over others.113 
The concept of gravity plays a significant role in the selection of cases and situations to 
appear before the ICC. The OTP has first to select a situation based on the gravity of that 
situation. Secondly, it should select individual cases from inside a situation also on the basis 
of the gravity of incidents in that situation. 
3.2.2.1.1 Gravity and the Decision to Investigate a Situation 
Art. 53 of the Rome Statute regulates the initiation of an investigation. In deciding if there is a 
reasonable basis to proceed, the Prosecutor must consider three factors: (1) “if there is a 
reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction has been or is being 
committed”; (2) “whether the case is or would be admissible under art. 17”, which means that 
he has to consider gravity; and (3) if “there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that 
an investigation would not server the interest of justice”.114  
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The OTP tends to reference the gravity threshold, when justifying its selection of situations. 
Regarding its decision not to proceed with the Iraq Situation the OTP stated that art. 8(1) sets 
down a specific gravity threshold. According to this threshold “the Court shall have 
jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy 
or as a part of a large-scale commission of such crimes”.115 However, since this threshold 
isn’t t an element of the crime, the threshold only provides guidance that the Court should 
tend to focus on situations meeting these requirements.116 The OTP also emphasized that the 
number of potential victims, 4 to 12 victims of willful killing and limited number of victims 
of inhuman treatment “was of a different order than the number of victims in other situations 
under the investigation or analysis by the Office”.117 The OTP therefore concluded that the 
situation was “not of sufficient gravity to justify further action”.118 The wording “not of 
sufficient gravity to justify further action” seems to suggest that it’s not a comparison to other 
cases makes ground for prioritization, but a reference to a threshold.  
This way of justifying the OTPs selection of situations might lead to some unwanted 
implications. One of the goals of the ICC is to encourage states to meet their obligations to 
prosecute grave international crimes. If the OTP declares that a situation does not have 
sufficiently grave cases, this might have the opposite effect, as the state no longer have an 
incentive to act.119 In addition, rejection of a situation based on inadmissibility signals that 
cases of similar nature are outside the Court’s scope, which may limit the deterrent effect of 
the Court.120 On the other hand, if a case is rejected based on prioritization, this only signals 
that the Court currently has inadequate resources.121 
3.2.2.1.2 Gravity in the Selection of Cases 
The gravity threshold also plays a role in the selection of cases within a situation. The OTP 
cannot select cases that doesn’t meet the gravity threshold for admissibility. There are many 
potential cases that meet the gravity threshold under art. 17(1)(d) and the OTP can’t possibly 
prosecute them all. In selecting between admissible cases, the OTP therefore has full 
discretion and the Rome Statute is silent as to how the OTP should make its selection.  
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The OTP has confirmed that there is a distinction between gravity as a criterion for 
admissibility, and the assessment of gravity when exercising its prosecutorial discretion when 
selecting cases. 122 The Office has created some guidelines as to how it will select cases. 
However, it is a challenge to identify the precise criteria adopted by the OTP when selecting 
cases. It is often unclear whether the OTP is applying the gravity threshold for admissibility in 
art. 17(1)(d) or is exercising its prosecutorial discretion when it comes to case selection. 
 
According to the Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritization, the gravity of crimes as a 
case selection criterion refers to its strategy to focus its investigations and prosecutions “on 
the most serious crimes within a given situation that are of concern to the international 
community”.123 Further, the Policy Paper states that the assessment of gravity as a selection 
criterion is similar to gravity as a factor for admissibility. However, given that many cases 
might potentially be admissible under art. 17, the OTP “may apply a stricter test […] than that 
which is legally required for the admissibility test”.124 The use of the word “may” seems to 
suggest that the OTP does not have to apply a stricter test.  
When assessing the gravity of a crime, the OTP will take into consideration; the scale, nature, 
manner of commission and the impact.125 The scale of the crimes can be considered by the 
number of victims, the extent of damage caused, both bodily and psychologically, and their 
geographical or temporal spread.126 The manner of commission can be assessed by the means 
used to execute the crime, or if the crimes were systematic or resulted from a plan or policy 
etc.127  
Other than the gravity of the crimes the OTP takes the degree of responsibility of the alleged 
perpetrators into its assessment.128 The OTP has publicly stated that it will only focus on the 
individuals with the greatest responsibility.129 However, it may need to investigate and 
prosecute a limited number of mid- and high- level perpetrators, to build the evidentiary 
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foundations for cases against those most responsible. If a conduct has been particularly grave, 
the Office may also decide to prosecute against lower level-perpetrators.130  
The Policy Paper also points out that the notion of the most responsible doesn’t always 
correspond with the hierarchical status of an individual within a structure.131 The degree of 
responsibility of an alleged perpetrator will be determined based on; the nature of unlawful 
behaviour, degree of participation and intent, the existence of any discriminating motive, and 
abuse of power or official capacity.132 
When it comes to the prioritisation between cases, the OTP uses several strategic case 
prioritisation criteria. Among these criteria are the impact of investigations and prosecutions 
on the victims and affected communities, and their contribution to the prevention of crimes.133 
However, the statements made by the OTP that it will focus on the gravest crimes and the 
most responsible perpetrators may appear somewhat confusing when compared to their actual 
practice. The OTP rejected the Iraq Situation, concerned with willful killing, while on the 
other hand finding the DRC Situations grave enough, which concerned enlisting and 
conscripting child soldiers and using them to participate actively in hostilities.134 One may 
argue that willful killing is more grave than conscripting and enlisting children. The same 
criticism has been raised against the OTP because of its rejection of the Flotilla Incident135, 
whilst going forward with a case concerned with destruction of property.136 
On the other hand, one could argue that in charging Lubanga137 and Al Mahdi, the OTP 
prioritised the impact of these specific types of crimes, before the nature of seemingly more 
grave crimes perpetrated against persons; like killings, rape and torture. The use of child 
soldiers was a widespread and under-addressed problem, just as destruction of cultural 
property in armed conflicts is a widespread problem where impunity as reigned for a long 
time. These decisions indicate that the OTP sees the ICC as playing an active role in 
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communicating moral and legal condemnation. 138The OTP might as a result, chose to 
prosecute crimes that haven’t received adequate attention in the international community. It is 
important to remember that one of the goals of the ICC, is to end impunity for perpetrators of 
the crimes under the statute.139   
3.2.2.2 Pre-Trial Chambers  
3.2.2.2.1 Lubanga - PTC I’s Interpretation of Gravity 
The first judicial interpretation of the gravity threshold came in Lubanga.140 The Chamber 
applied a literal, contextual and teleological interpretation of art. 17(1)(d), in accordance with 
the interpretative criteria provided in art. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.  
The PTC I observed that the gravity threshold under art. 17 was included in addition to the 
drafter’s careful selection crimes in art. 6-8.141 In continuation, the Chamber noted that a 
literal interpretation makes the application of art. 17(1)(d) mandatory. The chapeau of art. 
17(1) uses the term “shall”, which leaves the Court no discretion as to declare a case 
inadmissible if it is “not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court”. 142 The 
Chamber proceeded to confirm that the threshold must be applied at two different stages, the 
stage of initiation of the investigation and once a case arises from the investigation. It then 
emphasised that the scope of the decision was limited to the content of the gravity threshold 
when applied to a case arising from the investigation from a situation.143 
The PTC I concluded, based on the fact that the gravity threshold of art. 17 is in addition to 
“the gravity-driven selection of crimes”,144 that the relevant conduct must present particular 
features which render it especially grave.145 Thus, the PTC I established two elements that 
must be present for conduct to meet the gravity threshold. First, the conduct must be either 
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“systematic or large-scale”. Additionally, to being systematic or large-scale, due 
consideration must be given to the “social alarm” such conduct may have caused in the 
international community.146 The Chamber stated that if isolated instances were sufficient, 
there would be no need to establish an additional gravity threshold.147 No additional 
interpretative arguments were used to support “social alarm” element.  
Furthermore, from a teleological interpretation, the PTC I claimed that the gravity threshold 
against the backdrop of the Preamble led to the conclusion that the gravity threshold is “a key 
tool provided by the drafters to maximise the Court’s deterrent effect”.148 Art. 17(1)(d) was 
therefore considered to ensure that the ICC only initiates “cases […] against the most senior 
leaders suspected of being the most responsible for the crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Cour.t”149 
This additional factor was comprised of three elements. First, the position of the person (most 
senior leaders). Second, the roles such persons play, through acts or omissions. Third, the role 
played by such State entities, organisations or armed groups in the overall commission. A 
focus on these types of individuals was seen to truly maximise the deterrent effect of the 
Court. 150 
The PTC I set a very high threshold for gravity by focusing on senior leaders only and the 
developed criteria has been harshly criticised in legal literature.151 
3.2.2.2.2 The Appeal Chamber’s Dismissal of the Gravity Threshold Established by the 
PTC I 
The Appeals Chamber overturned the decision by the PTC I as it found the test developed by 
the PTC I was incorrect.152  
In Lubanga the gravity threshold was found to require “systematic or large-scale” conduct, 
causing “social alarm”. In addition, the PTC I stated that the gravity threshold required the 
                                                
146 Ibid, para 46. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid, para 48. 
149 Ibid, para 50. 
150 Ibid, para 51-53 
151 Stegmiller (2009), p. 551 
152 Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-169, Judgment on the Prosecutor's Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber 
I entitled "Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58" (July 13, 2006) [hereafter DRC 




Court to only prosecute “the most senior leaders suspected of being the most responsible for 
the crimes” in order to maximise the Court’s deterrence. 153 
The Appeals Chamber states that the factors introduced by the PTC I, are based on a flawed 
contextual interpretation of the Statute. The requirement of a systematic or large-scale 
conduct set forth by the PTC I, was found to be inconsistent with the definitions of the crimes 
within the Court’s jurisdiction. 154 Regarding war crimes, the requirement of a large-scale 
commission is an alternative requirement to the commission as a part of a plan or policy. 
Moreover, the Appeals Chamber noted that the statutory requirement of either large-scale 
commission or part of a policy is not an absolute requirement155, cf. “in particular”156. Lastly, 
the Appeals Chamber pointed to the fact that the requirement of “systematic” commission of 
crimes is limited to art. 7 concerning crimes against humanity. The PTC I’s interpretation can 
therefore be said to go against the language of the Statute. 
When it came to the “social alarm” element, the Appeals Chamber criticised the PTC for not 
explaining where it derived this criterion from, as the Rome Statute makes no mention of 
“social alarm” at all.157  
The Appeals Chamber also disagreed that the gravity threshold restricts admissibility to cases 
against the most senior leaders most responsible for the crimes. Contrary to what PTC I 
suggested, it rightfully claimed that the exclusion of a category of perpetrators per se, would 
not lead to the highest deterrent effect.158 Lower-level perpetrators would then know that there 
would be no risk of them being brought before the ICC, and this can clearly not be said to 
deter them from the commissioning of crimes under the Statute.  
The teleological interpretation also conflicted with a contextual interpretation of the Statute. If 
only the most senior leaders and were to be brought before the Court, art. 33 which 
establishes rules relating to the irrelevance of superior orders would be unnecessary. In 
addition, art. 27 (1) stipulated that the Statute “shall apply equally to all persons without any 
distinction based on official capacity”.159 Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber pointed to the 
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language in the Preamble. The Preamble refers only to “the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community”, not “the most serious perpetrators”. If the drafters of the Rome 
Statute wanted to limit the Courts jurisdiction to the most senior leaders it would have done so 
expressively.160 
Although, the Appeals Chamber essentially disagreed with every factor the PTC developed in 
its determination of the gravity threshold, it failed to come up with its own test. The Appeals 
Chamber had no obligation to do so, it left the ICC with a legal vacuum.161 
Judge Pikis, however, wrote a separate and partly dissenting opinion. In his view the gravity 
threshold in art. 17(1)(d) should be understood as a limitation against insignificant cases, 
unworthy of consideration by the Court.162 
3.2.2.2.3 Newer Assessments of the Gravity Threshold by the PTC 
Some newer assessments of the gravity threshold have been provided by the PTC. 
 In Abu Garda163, the Chamber agreed with the OTP’s view that “nature, manner and impact” 
of the crime is essential when assessing the gravity of a case. The PTC also stated that the 
gravity of a case “should not be assessed only from a quantitative perspective”, as the 
qualitative dimension of the crime also should be taken into consideration.164 
Of relevance to the assessment of gravity, the Chamber found that certain factors listed in rule 
145(1)(c) of the Regulations of the OTP could be of guidance. Namely, these factors included 
“the extent of harm caused to the victims and their families, the nature of the unlawful 
behaviour and the means employed to execute the crime.”165 
The PTC made no mention of factors related to the position and seniority of the perpetrator, 
which points in the direction that this notion as a requirement for reaching the gravity 
threshold has been discarded for good. 
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In  Ali166the PTC found the assertion that a case concerning omissions, could not rise to the 
level of sufficient gravity to be insupportable. Nothing in the Statute could be interpreted to 
exclude acts by omission from the purview of the Court. It would also be contrary to the 
object and purpose of the ICC to interpret the gravity threshold in a way which would reduce 
the subject-matter jurisdiction.167 
3.2.2.2.4 Conclusion 
The language of art. 17(1)(d) and its context indicate that it’s a threshold that needs to be met 
before a case can be brought before the Court. It does not indicate that the Court’s jurisdiction 
is limited to the gravest situations or the most serious cases within a situation.168 The gravity 
of other cases should be treated as unrelated to the case in question in determining the gravity 
threshold. The gravity threshold should be used by the Court, only to exclude cases 
concerning insignificant crimes, unworthy of action by the Court. The lack of discussion of 
the gravity threshold in the drafting history of the Rome Statute suggests that it was never 
intended to limit the subject-matter jurisdiction in any significant degree. The Court’s 
jurisdiction is limited to the core international crimes, which by their nature are serious. It 
therefore seems that the gravity threshold only should exclude cases that can’t be said to be 
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4 The Al Mahdi Case 
4.1 About  
On 27th September 2016 Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (hereafter “Al Mahdi”) was sentenced to 
nine years in prison by the ICC. Al Mahdi was found guilty as a co-perpetrator of the war 
crime consisting in intentionally directing attacks against religious and historic buildings in 
Timbuktu, pursuant to Art. 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute.169 In specific, Al Mahdi was 
charged with attacking a number of UNESCO World Heritage Sites in Timbuktu, Mali, in 
June and July 2012. The sites were nine mausoleums and one mosque.170 Wilful destruction 
of cultural property and heritage, that does not constitute a military objective, has been 
prohibited for a long time, but no one has been indicted with destruction of cultural property 
as the principal or only charge before the Al Mahdi case was brought before the ICC. 
The Al Mahdi case is remarkable as it is the first time that an individual has been charged 
with and held accountable exclusively for destruction of cultural property, not only before the 
ICC, but internationally. The Al Mahdi case is also exceptional as it is the first case before the 
ICC in which a defendant pled guilty.171 Lastly, Al Mahdi is the first member of an Islamist 
armed group to appear before the ICC.172 
The conviction of Al Mahdi by the ICC represents a noteworthy development in international 
criminal law. It demonstrates that the OTP has an interest in bringing cases of wilful 
destruction of cultural property before the ICC, and by bringing such cases before the ICC, 
ending the impunity that has been associated with cultural destruction crimes for such a long 
time. The OTP wanted to make clear that to intentionally direct an attack against historic 
monuments and buildings dedicated to religion constitutes a war crime, punishable under the 
Rome Statute. The OTP emphasized that: 
 “humanity’s common heritage is subject to repeated and planned ravages by individuals and 
groups whose goal is to eradicate the physical any representation of a world that differs from 
theirs by eliminating the physical manifestations that are at the heart of communities.” 173  
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The case and the statement by the Prosecutor indicates that the ICC will hold future 
perpetrators of destruction of cultural property responsible. Al Mahdi gives the international 
community anticipation and hope that such cases will be prosecuted in the future, and that the 
individuals responsible will be indicted. 
Willful destruction of cultural property and heritage is not a new phenomenon. Since ancient 
times destruction of cultural property has been a consequence of warfare. Previously, 
however, the destruction of cultural property was more a consequence of war, than a result of 
a programmed and deliberated agenda of destruction.174 Today, cultural property is being 
destroyed at a disconcertingly high rate in different armed conflicts across the world, like  
ISIS’s destruction of Palmyra in the Syrian Civil War.175 Destruction of cultural property is 
actively and deliberately used as a weapon against the civilian population to cause them 
suffering and to eradicate their culture.  This has caused an increased outcry in the 
international community for the prosecution of this type of war crimes. Since the crime of 
deliberately destroying cultural property has gained much more attention and concern 
internationally, the Al Mahdi case may set an important precedent for the ICC in future cases. 
Because Al Mahdi was the first case in which the ICC applied Article 8(2)(e)(iv), the Court 
proceeded to interpret the crime and its elements.176 Thus, the case may provide insight into 
substantive international criminal law, as to how the war crime of destruction of cultural 
property will be interpreted in the future. Al Mahdi was also the first defendant to plead guilty 
before the ICC.  
4.2 Background 
The ICC Prosecutor opened an investigation into war crimes in Mali 16 January 2013, after 
the situation in Mali was referred to the ICC by the Malian State.177  
A non-international armed conflict took place in Mali in January 2012.  In relation to that 
conflict different armed groups took control over Northern Mali. In April 2012, the groups 
Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) took control over Timbuktu, and 
imposed their religious and political commandments on its inhabitants. The Ansar Dine and 
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AQIM created a local government, which included an Islamic Tribunal, a police force, a 
media commission and a morality brigade known as the Hesbah.178 The role of the Hesbah 
was the prevention, suppression and repression of anything perceived by the Ansar Dine to 
constitute immorality.  
Al Mahdi also known as “Abou Tourab”179 was an expert of religious matters and head of the 
Hesbah.180 Al Mahdi was in direct contact with the leaders of Ansar Dine and AQIM. In his 
role as the head of the Hesbah and as an expert on matters of religion, he was often consulted. 
He was very active in all aspects of the Ansar Dine and AQIM administrations.181 
In June 2012, Al Mahdi was consulted by the leader of Ansar Dine and two prominent AQIM 
members regarding the decision to destroy the mausoleums. Al Mahdi expressed that to 
maintain relations with the population, he did not recommend the destruction of the 
mausoleums. Despite his initial objection, Al Mahdi accepted to carry out the attack without 
hesitation on reception of the instruction. Al Mahdi personally determined the succession in 
which the buildings were to be attacked, and he wrote and performed a sermon explaining and 
validating the destruction of the mausoleums. 182 
The attack on the mausoleums was carried out between 30 June and 11 July 2012. The attack 
resulted in the destruction of ten of the most well-known cultural sites in Timbuktu, most of 
them UNESCO World Heritage Sites. The sites were dedicated to religion and historic 
monuments, and none of them were military objectives.183 
4.3 Findings 
4.3.1 Admission of Guilt 
The ICC found that Al Mahdi understood the nature and consequences of his admission of 
guilt, and that he made the admission of guilt voluntarily. The Court was also satisfied that the 
admission of guilt was supported by the facts of the case.184 
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4.3.2 Findings on Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Statute 
Al Mahdi as the head of the Hesbah, was put in charge of the execution of destroying the 
mausoleums and mosques. With the attackers accompanying him they directed an attack, that 
resulted in destruction or significant damage to all the buildings. 185 
When it comes to the element of “directing and attack” the ICC made it clear that this 
includes “any acts of violence against protected objects and will not make a distinction to 
whether it was carried out in the conduct of hostilities or after the object had fallen under the 
control of an armed group”, as international humanitarian law protects cultural objects from 
crimes committed both in battle and outside of it.186 It was also noted that Article 8(2)(e)(iv) 
of the Statute criminalizes the act of directing a specific kind of attack irrespective of whether 
the buildings in question are destroyed.187 
The Court found it clear that the mausoleums and mosques were the object of the attack, and 
that Al Mahdi and the perpetrators intended these building to be the object of the attack. The 
Court established that the destroyed mausoleums and mosques, qualified as both religious 
buildings and historic monuments. The Court emphasized both their role in the cultural life in 
Timbuktu and the status of nine of these buildings as UNESCO World Heritage Sites. Their 
status as UNESCO World Heritage sites underlined their special importance to international 
cultural heritage.188 
The contextual element was deemed fulfilled as the acts took place in the context of, and were 
associated with, a non-international armed conflict between the Malian Government and 
groups including Ansar Dine and AQIM.189 Ansar Dine and AQIM met the requirement of an 
organized armed group and the degree of intensity in the conflict was of sufficient intensity. 
Ansar Dine and AQIM had the military capacity to displace the Malian army, and take control 
over Timbuktu, establishing some form of government.190 They were aware of the factual 
circumstances which established the existence of the armed conflict. 191  
4.3.3 Assessment of the Gravity of the Crime 
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When addressing the gravity of the crime committed by Al Mahdi, the Court especially 
considered: the extent of damage caused or impact, the nature of the crimes committed and 
the circumstances of the time, place and manner.192 
The Court started its assessment by noting that crimes against property, even if inherently 
grave, are generally of lesser gravity that crimes committed against persons.193 Considering 
the extent of damage caused, the Court emphasized that the ten mausoleums and mosques 
were mostly completely destroyed. It also argued that the impact of the attack on the 
population was enhanced by it being broadcasted in the media. The Court stressed that 
Timbuktu played a crucial role in the expansion of Islam in the region, and was the heart of 
Mali’s cultural heritage. The mausoleums played a psychological role to the extent of being 
perceived as protecting the people of Timbuktu and the people of Timbuktu were collectively 
ensuring their maintenance.194 The Court considered the fact that the targeted buildings were 
not only religious buildings, but had a symbolic and emotional value for the people of 
Timbuktu a relevant factor in assessing the gravity of the crime.195 
In addition, the Court underlined that, all sites but one, were UNESCO World Heritage Sites. 
Attacks on such sites was seen to be of particular gravity as their destruction not only affected 
the direct victims of the crime, but also the people throughout Mali and the international 
community. Another factor the Court emphasized in their assessment of gravity, was that the 
destruction of the mausoleums were aimed at breaking the soul of the people of Timbuktu. 
Lastly, the Court stated that the discriminatory religious motive behind the destruction 
undoubtedly was relevant to its assessment of the gravity of the crime. 196Considering all 
these factors together the Court found that the crime for which Al Mahdi was convicted was 
of sufficient gravity. 
4.3.4 Al Mahdi’s Contribution to the Attack 
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Pursuant to Art. 25(3)(a) Al Mahdi was found guilty of co-perpetration of the war crime 
consisting of attacking protected objects. The ICC highlighted Al Mahdi’s role as head of the 
Hesbah and his overall responsibility for the execution phase of the attack.197  
There were namely five ways, in which Al Mahdi was found to have contributed to the attack. 
First of all, he was responsible for supervising and overseeing the execution of the attack, 
using men from the Hesbah. Secondly, he collected, brought and distributed the necessary 
tools to successfully carry out the destruction. Thirdly, Al Mahdi was present at all sites of 
destruction, giving instructions and moral support. Fourthly, he personally participated in the 
attack that led to the destruction of at least five sites, and lastly he was responsible for 
explaining and justifying the attack to journalists.198  
Collectively, these contributions were seen by the Court to qualify as an essential contribution 
to the commission of the crime, made pursuant to an agreement with others.199 The Court also 
emphasized that co-perpetration not only embodies his physical participation, but also 
encompasses his position of authority in relation to the crimes that were carried out.200  
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5 Were the Crimes Committed by Al 
Mahdi of Sufficiently Grave? 
The gravity threshold in art. 17(1)(d) requires the Court to deem cases not “of sufficient 
gravity” to be inadmissible. The OTP also makes a gravity assessment when choosing to open 
an investigation and when choosing cases from within that situation. The OTP has specified 
that when assessing which cases or situations that meet the gravity threshold it considers 
factors like “the scale, nature, manner of commission of the crimes, and their impact”.201 
5.1 Can Destruction of Cultural Property as the 
Principal Charge Be “of sufficient gravity”?  
Although, the Court confirmed that crimes committed against persons are graver, it still saw 
destruction of cultural property as a crime of significant gravity, and as such meeting the 
gravity threshold.202  
 One may argue that crimes committed against persons, like killings, rape and torture, are 
more heinous, but this does not mean that there are no other serious crimes of international 
concern that justifies action by the court. You could also argue that it would lead to unwanted 
repercussions if the ICC only prosecuted crimes like killings and rape. If the ICC were to 
build up a hierarchy of the crimes within its Statute, and only prosecuting the crimes that 
cause the most moral judgement, like killings and rape, this sends a signal that other types of 
crimes are not sufficiently grave to warrant prosecution. One of the established goals of the 
ICC is deterrence. If the ICC had limited itself to only prosecuting crimes committed against 
persons, it would have signalled that destruction of cultural property is not sufficiently grave 
to warrant prosecution. Based on the prevalence of wilful destruction of cultural property in 
armed conflicts, it is clear deterrence is wanted. When impunity has been the norm for these 
types of crimes, commissioners of destruction of cultural property has had no real threat of 
prosecution. Besides, if national courts had seen that destruction of cultural property was “not 
of sufficient gravity” to justify action by the ICC, it would give an incentive not to pay 
attention to these types of cases. 
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One of the arguments that has been used to criticise the Al Mahdi case is that the drafters 
envisaged that these crimes would only be prosecuted once committed in combination with 
other war crimes.203 
 In my opinion, it would be too easy to dismiss that willful destruction of cultural property can 
meet the gravity threshold as a principle charge before the ICC. To take this argument to the 
extreme, all cultural property in a country or in several countries in an armed conflict could 
deliberately be destroyed and not meet the gravity threshold, if the perpetrator cannot be 
charged with other war crimes as well. Not every instance of cultural destruction will justify 
action by the Court, but clearly destruction of cultural property can meet the gravity threshold, 
if the scale, manner of commission and impact is significant enough. To claim that destruction 
of cultural property never is of sufficient gravity to justify, because conflicting physical harm 
to individuals is more heinous must clearly be wrong. 
Moreover, the argument that destruction of cultural property is meant only to be prosecuted as 
an auxiliary charge to other war crimes, seems to find no support in the Rome Statute. If the 
drafters never intended destruction of cultural property only to be prosecuted together with 
other war crimes, it could have expressly stated this. 
5.2 Did  Al Mahdi meet the Gravity Threshold? 
As established in the analysis of the gravity threshold, the Court should only exclude cases 
that can’t be said to be serious enough to cause concern in the international community.204 
 The Al Mahdi case is in line with the goal of ending impunity for the most serious crimes of 
international concern. 205 Wilful destruction of cultural property is a serious crime of 
international concern. During the Balkan Wars destruction of cultural property was used to 
remove the memory and identity, of the groups subjected to ethnic cleansing. Taliban, ISIS 
and other affiliated groups continues to use destruction of cultural property as their main tool 
to conquering and destroying groups which they are opposed to. The annihilation and looting 
by these groups have been of a massive scale. The fact that destruction of cultural property in 
today’s warfare is used as a tool to erase the identity and cultural heritage of particular groups 
shows that this crime is of concern to international community.  
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Futhermore, cultural heritage play an important role in people’s lives, as places that gives 
identity, often strongly linked with their beliefs. Vibeke Jensen Director of the UNESCO 
Office in New York stated in relation to the destruction in Timbuktu that; “[b]y damaging and 
destroying cultural heritage of a community, one is in fact not only destroying the past but 
very much the future […]a community’s cultural heritage reflects its life, history and identity. 
Its preservation helps rebuild broken communities, re-establish their identities”.206 
The mausoleum and mosques that Al Mahdi destroyed were not only the heart of Mali’s 
cultural heritage, playing a psychological role to the extent of being perceived as protecting 
the people of Timbuktu, but UNESCO World Heritage Sites. Their destruction as a result 
affected, not only the people of Timbuktu, but the entire international community.207 
The Al Mahdi must therefore be said to meet the gravity threshold of the ICC. 
Another issue that has been raised concerning the trial against Al Mahdi is that he didn’t bear 
the greatest responsibility for the crime as other members of Ansar Dine and AQIM likely 
were equally responsible.208 
As previously established the notion that only the most senior leaders most responsible for the 
crime, meets the gravity threshold has been rejected by the ICC. The role of the perpetrator is 
just one of many factors playing into the gravity determination. 
Al Mahdi supervised the destruction, collected, brought and distributed the necessary tools, 
personally participated in the destruction of at least five sited and justified the attack before 
the media. As the head of the Hesbah and an expert on religious matters he played a key role 
the destruction and must be said to bear sufficient responsibility to justify prosecution. 
However, one might criticize the OTP for choosing the Al Mahdi case, while not going 
further with other situations, like the Flotilla incident. As previously stated the ICC has 
limited resources. The OTP therefore has discretion when it comes to selecting between cases. 
Based on the OTPs selection of cases, it sometimes chose cases concerning crimes that have 
been under-addressed, like the conscription of child soldiers in Lubanga and destruction of 
cultural property in Al Mahdi. This might seem to go against statements it has made of 
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focusing on “the most serious crimes and most responsible perpetrators”, causing some 
confusion in the international community. The OTP seems to reject cases based on them not 
meeting the gravity threshold in art. 17(1)(d), however the OTP should be clearer when its 
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